This article reveals how Turkish-Syrian relations have evolved from a common historical background, culture and civilization. Times of tension have occurred in this mutual relationship during which both sides have experienced conflict, enmity and heightened security concerns. Bashar al-Assad's ascent to power in Syria in 2000 and the rise of the Justice and Development Party in 2002 in Turkey marked a new stage in bilateral relations. At that time, Turkey and Syria were engaged in political and economic cooperation to improve their relations. However, with the emergence and spread of the Arab Spring into Syria, the relaxation of tensions could not be perpetuated. The effects of the Arab Spring were felt in Syrian society by March 2011, when Syrians were exposed to the cruelty and increasing bloodshed of the Assad regime. Turkey initially called for political reforms from the Assad administration that did not occur. Regional and international actors, including Turkey, subsequently attempted to broker a peaceful resolution for the crisis. Several meetings and conferences were organized, and a six-point Annan Plan was prepared, but all attempts failed to produce concrete results. Turkish-Syrian relations continued to deteriorate. Bilateral relations entered a phase of disengagement during which several tension-escalating incidents occurred, such as the downing of military jets by both sides and bomb explosions on Turkish territory. This study focuses on the inability of both regional and international actors to produce a peaceful and effective resolution to the Syrian crisis, which has had regional and global effects. The study also describes and analyzes various perspectives regarding the nature of the crisis.
STRUCTURED ABSTRACT
This article reveals how Turkish-Syrian relations have evolved from a common historical background, culture and civilization. Times of tension have occurred in this mutual relationship during which both sides have experienced conflict, enmity and heightened security concerns. Bashar al-Assad's ascent to power in Syria in 2000 and the rise of the Justice and Development Party in 2002 in Turkey marked a new stage in bilateral relations. At that time, Turkey and Syria were engaged in political and economic cooperation to improve their relations. To that end, bilateral agreements were concluded between the sides. All those improvements resulted in an atmosphere where both actors managed to overcome past enmities and biases. However, since the start of the "Arab Spring", Turkey, who had previously assumed a policy of "zero problems with the neighbors", experienced the new realities of the region with the emergence of the Syrian crisis through a period in which the struggle for power in Syria transformed into a bloody civil war. Turkey initially struggled to quickly implement policies that would preserve the stability and unity of Damascus. Once the problem escalated, Turkey attempted to determine whether the Assad regime would succeed in controlling the opposition in the country. Because the Assad regime failed to accomplish that objective, Turkey warned the administration and demanded the implementation of necessary reforms in an attempt to prevent the increasing incidents from deepening the social conflict in Syria. Turkey cultivated intimate relations with the Syrian administration until quite recently but struggled to encourage transformation of the regime by means of constitutional reforms. Because Turkey's expectations of Syrian reforms were not satisfied, Turkey called for Assad's removal from power and attempted to encourage countries in the region to actively support sanctions against Syria. Moreover, she started to offer explicit support to the Syrian opposition; backing up their political and military organizations.
Then, Turkish sanctions on the Damascus administration followed, which were responded with counter-sanctions by the Assad regime. As a result, bilateral relations continued to deteriorate.
As a further step, the Turkish administration aimed for a regime change in Syria by means of a regional and international pressure; namely UN Security Council. However, Russian and Chinese veto of the UN resolution concerning the Syrian crisis made them center of criticism. From the Turkish perspective, the Russian and Chinese policies drove Syria into a greater state of chaos. Following the failure of the resolution by the Damascus administration, other steps were taken to provide a solution for the Syrian issue. A-six point UN proposal was prepared in April 2012, with Kofi Annan taking part as the intermediary between the sides. Moreover, "Friends of Syria" meetings were held in order to put a halt to the Syrian tragedy and establish a peaceful environment. Nevertheless, bilateral relations continued to worsen even further after the shot-down of a Turkish F-4 jet in 2012 by the Syrian security forces and when mortar shells fired by Syrian military forces struck Akçakale, a town in Turkey, killing and injuring Turkish citizens. Once more, regional and international efforts to produce a peaceful solution for the Syrian problem remained inadequate and Turkey was
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Volume 11/2 Winter 2016 disappointed over again. In fact, Turkey's miscalculation of the Assad regime's resilience, the structure of the opposition and the efficiency of regional actors all contributed to Turkey's disappointment that its expectations for Syria were not fulfilled. All those developments paved the way for a feeling of isolation from Turkish point of view in relation to the Syrian crisis.
As the crisis continued to deepen and turn out more severe, Turkey has begun addressing the Syrian strife occurring near its borders with more caution, being aware of the severe consequences that the chaos would bear in case Turkey made miscalculations in approaching the problem. Turkey has also been concerned about the political, economic and social problems likely to be generated as a consequence of social disintegration in Syria, which could result in the transformation of Nusayri, Kurdish, Sunni and Christian regions into semi-independent military and political structures corresponding to those in Lebanon. In addition to the developments related to the Syrian crisis, Turkey has dealt with political unrest that began with the Gezi incidents and continued through the local elections on March 30, 2014. While dealing with its unrest at home, it emerged as an indication of an isolationist stance that Turkey would adopt approaching the Syrian issue; yet the tension between the sides seemed likely to continue which was clearly seen as a consequence of Turkey's shooting down of a Syrian helicopter at the Turkish border for violating its air space. Under these circumstances, it would be appropriate to claim that Turkey, in such an environment, would better review its foreign policy choices and proceed by developing a much broader vision towards the Syrian issue. Turkish-Syrian relations began in the aftermath of the Second World War with Syria's integration into the international system as an independent state. However, due to the circumstances of Syria's foundation, Syrian relations with Turkey developed on a limited basis. Aside from the legal dimension of bilateral relations, both societies had long participated in the development of a common history, culture and civilization. The Turks had migrated from their original homeland in Central Asia to several regions of Asia, Europe and Africa, beginning in the early 2000s BC and continuing until the 11 th century. Those who set out west from Central Asia settled in Iran, Iraq, Anatolia, Syria, Egypt and Africa. The Turks who ascended to command the Abbasid and Umayyad armies due to their military talent had largely settled in the aforementioned regions. Subsequent to the Seljuk Rulers in Syria, the Syrian region was ruled by the Great Seljuk Empire, the Zengids, the Ayyubids, the Mongols, Timur, the Mamelukes and the Ottomans. Syria, which had been part of the Ottoman Empire for 400 years, became a Frenchmandated state following the First World War when the League of Nations officially assigned France authority over the Syrian state in 1923 (Demir, 2011: 696) . From 1920 until 1936, the government was administered by French high commissioners. French dominance of the country and the commitment to preserve this dominance generated a system of oppression that led to internal upheaval and insurrection. Unable to subdue the insurrection and the rapidly rising front of Arab nationalism, France signed a treaty recognizing Syrian independence in September 1936, provided that French soldiers remain in the country. Syrian independence rekindled the question of the ownership of the Hatay region between Turkey and Syria, which was resolved in Turkey's favor after 3 years. Syria never wished to cede Hatay to Turkey, and it depicted the region in state maps as part of Syria (Franco-Turkish Agreement, 1923) .
Keywords
France lost its control over Syria due to the financial and administrative burden of the Second World War and ultimately had to withdraw from the region by 1946. Tension emerged between the newly independent Syrian state and Turkey. The three prominent issues influencing Turkish-Syrian relations have typically been "Hatay, water, and terror" (Demir, 2011: 696-709) . Syrians also resented Turkey's increasing cooperation with Israel (James and Özdamar, 2009: 30) . Nevertheless, bilateral relations that had long been characterized by conflict, enmity and security concerns began to enter a phase of relaxation after the 1998 Adana Agreement. After Bashar alAssad's ascension to power in Syria in 2000 and the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Bishku, 2012: 46-48; Robins, 2007: 296) . Until March 2011, the Erdoğan administration abstained from directly criticizing the Syrian regime and played a crucial role in neutralizing the US-supported international pressure against the Assad administration.
However, the Turkish Justice and Development Party, which had assumed a policy of "zero problems with the neighbors" (Demirtaş, 2013: 111-112; Hursoy, 2011: 153) in the wake of the Arab Spring, was forced to choose between a Syrian administration with improved relations and a Syrian population demanding greater democracy. As the only Muslim country in the Middle East with democratic values, Turkey sided with the pro-democracy Syrian population, although the Turkish administration was initially uncertain about its policy towards Syria. In particular, the attempts of the Syrian regime to militarily suppress peaceful protests and the mass movement of Syrians fleeing to Turkey to avoid the civil war set the scene for a serious crisis in Turkish-Syrian relations. Turkey has been the country most affected by the bloodshed and the violations of human rights throughout Syria.
2011: From Cooperation to Tension
The shift in relations between Erdoğan and al-Assad commenced with the rise of mass protests on March 15, 2011 and the tendency of the Damascus regime to suppress the civil opposition by force. The Syrian regime claimed it was struggling with an insurgency, and the major focus of the regime's rhetoric involved the issue of terrorism. Furthermore, the Syrian administration alleged that foreign-aided "terrorist groups" were provoking the conflicts ("Esad, Beklenen Konuşmasını Yaptı," 2011). The Turkish attitude towards Syria was interpreted differently by domestic and foreign public opinion and observed with deep concern. Turkish apprehensions that the Syrian issue might become a regional or global crisis were partially eased by Assad's promise of reform in the initial days of the crisis.
1 Nonetheless, taking full account of the (Robins, 2013: 48) .
The first signs of rupture in Turkish-Syrian relations began to appear when Turkey opened its doors to Syrians fleeing their homeland, providing the Syrian opposition with means in Istanbul and Antalya to organize and represent themselves in the international community. In early June, Turkey began to explicitly criticize the Syrian administration. For example, on July 9, Prime Minister Erdoğan demonstrated Turkish hardening against the Syrian regime by stating that "They continue to murder our brothers and then unashamedly have their photos taken with their weapons. We cannot keep still about the developments in Syria. Intimate relations cannot be maintained forever" ("Erdoğan'dan Esad Ailesine Sert Mesaj," 2011). However, the Justice and Development Party government and Prime Minister Erdoğan supported the smooth integration of Syria into the international system and thus sought to prevent the development of possible conflict and chaos. Thus Turkey, not expecting such a set up, began to stiffen and sharpen its attitude and discourse against the Assad regime.
2
In early August 2011 when Turkish-Syrian relations began to deteriorate, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan sent Foreign Minister Davutoğlu to Damascus in an attempt to offer a last chance at bilateral relations (Robins, 2013: 395) . Prior to Davutoğlu's visit, Justice and Development Party spokesperson Bülent Arınç remarked that the Turkish side called for concrete steps to be taken and sought an end to the bloodshed and an implementation of democratic reforms by the Syrian administration.
3 On August 9, at a 6.5-hour meeting held between Davutoğlu and Assad, Davutoğlu explicitly attempted to persuade Assad to change; however, Assad, claiming that he feared the destabilization of Syria by the "terrorists", said that he would not assent to any type of change ("Davutoğlu: Ne Olacağını Günler İçinde Göreceğiz," 2011).
Subsequent to its disappointment that its expectations would not be satisfied, Turkey gravitated toward raising regional pressure on the Syrian administration. Following the August meeting, Turkey began to offer explicit support to the Syrian opposition, contributing to their political and military organizations, and also began stepping back from economic relations with Syria. On November 22, Erdoğan publicly called for Assad's removal from power for the first time. 4 In accordance with Turkey's new strategy, Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu began to was prepared for the economy by the Justice and Development Party. "Ankara'dan Esad'a Reform Şansı," Hürriyet, May 8, 2011. 2 The Turkish government was fully aware of the Syrian issue being more than a local problem and that the developments in Syria posed the threat of profoundly affecting the entire Middle East, including Turkey and beyond. Therefore, Turkey continued to refer to the Syrian problem as regional and global. Conversely, in a statement on May 15, 2011, Prime Minister Erdoğan described the Turkish view as follows: "The Syrian case should not be regarded as the one in Libya. Libya could be evaluated as a foreign policy analysis from the Turkish point of view, whereas the Syrian situation should be held separate. The situation in Syria has been one that we should be assessing as a domestic policy… and one that we have been sharing very strong relationships with." "Suriye Adeta İç Politika," Hürriyet, May 15, 2011. Thus, Turkey evaluated the Syrian crisis as an internal matter and focused primarily on the risk of its own suffering from the rising instability in the region. In this sense, Erdoğan's statement is noteworthy for displaying how Turkey has been involved in the Syrian question.
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attend meetings of the Arab Union, which aimed to end the crisis. He announced that Turkey supported the Arab Union's sanctions against Syria. Soon afterwards, Turkey announced that it approved nine-point sanctions in parallel with those of the Arab Union. Until a legitimate regime came to power, the Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation Council mechanism was suspended; a travel ban was imposed against scores of senior Syrian officials and businessmen, whose assets were frozen; the sales of various types of arms and military supplies to the Syrian army were halted; and the use of Turkish soil, water and airfields for the purpose of transferring weapons and military supplies to Syria was banned. Moreover, Turkey announced an end to relations with Syria's central bank and froze the assets of the Syrian government in Turkey (İlhan, 2011) . Although Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan said that the sanctions were aimed at the Assad regime and not the Syrian civilians, the sanctions on the Damascus administration have been the most severe that Turkey has ever imposed on any neighbor.
In addition to declaring the necessity of removing the Assad regime from power and the unreliability of the administration, Turkey also continued to support the organization and strengthening of opposition groups. Within this context, Turkey allowed the establishment of the Syrian National Council in its own territory (Yakış, 2014: 99-100) and promised to open a representative agency for the opposition in Turkey. The first office of the Syrian National Council in Turkey opened on December 15 in Ankara (Robins, 2013: 395 ; "Syrian National Council Opens Office in Ankara," 2011). The West also demonstrated its support for the Council, in which Prime Minister Erdoğan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu participated as members.
In response to Turkish sanctions, the Damascus administration attempted to damage the Turkish economy and adopted a series of counter-sanctions. As a reprisal, Syria suspended its free trade agreement with Turkey, halted Turkey's transit passages through Syria, imposed a 30% tax on imports from Turkey and established fuel limitations on Turkish vehicles ("Suriye'den Türkiye'ye Cevap Gecikmedi," 2011). In reaction, Turkey issued a second package of sanctions, raised taxes on Syrian imports by 30% and sought alternatives to transit freight shipment. Accordingly, Turkey opened two border gates: one to reduce Khabur border crossing traffic by establishing a second bridge at the Khabur exit, and a second gate to intensify shipping between the Ports of Iskenderun and Aqaba ("Türkiye'den Suriye'ye 'Reformları Hızla Uygulayın' Çağrısı," 2011).
Bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria that had developed based on a common cultural and historical background entered a period of regression and reached a breaking point by 2011. Turkish calls for reform from the Assad regime were left unanswered. Upon Syria's failure of satisfying Turkish expectations, bilateral relations were further strained due to sanctions imposed against Syria, harsh statements on both sides and Turkish support for the Syrian opposition (Ayoob, 2012: 92; Taheri, 2013: 218; Yakış, 2014: 99-100) which were subsequently met with Syrian counter-measures.
2012: From Tension to Disengagement
During this new phase of Syrian-Turkish relations, Turkey developed a policy advocating the "removal of Assad from power" that was influenced by its global expectations and regional goals. Moreover, Turkey expected to obtain a result as soon as possible through the power and confidence attained from its prestige within the Arab world. Nevertheless, the hardening attitude of the Turkish government toward the Syrian administration was interpreted differently by domestic and foreign public opinion and was mostly met with great concern.
5 For some, Turkey entered the
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orbit of the US and internalized a policy of "friends or enemies with neighbors upon instructions" within the scope of a US-led road map. Others perceived Turkey as seeking to enter a unilateral military intervention at any cost, following a discourse of "Neo-Ottomanism." (Demirtaş, 2013: 115; Kardaş, 2010: 116-117) However, Turkish decision makers rejected domestic and foreign criticisms and further defined the sole Turkish objective as ending the human tragedy in Syria and establishing an administration to represent the legitimate rights of the Syrian population.
6
Critical developments occurred in the beginning in 2012 when Turkey was advocating for change in Syria. Assad, who was sliding into a phase of problematic and troublesome relations with Turkey, tactically collaborated with the PYD (the Democratic Union Party), PKK's (Kurdistan Workers' Party) political extension in Syria. The first signs of that collaboration actually appeared in Beirut at the end of 2011. PKK flags and posters of Abdullah Öcalan were displayed during demonstrations in support of Assad held on October 31 in front of the Syrian Embassy in Beirut. 7 The approved return of PYD leader Salih Muhammed Müslüm to Syria from a long exile was further evidence of collaboration. The return of Müslüm was significant because it offered clear proof of Syria's use of the Kurdish trump card against Turkey. Concurrently, Assad explicitly threatened Turkey in an interview with the Western media, saying, "Syria is the central fault line of the region. Provided that the ground is moved redundantly, you would generate an earthquake that would become a crisis affecting the entire region. Assuming the plan is to have Syria divided, then the whole region would be divided; ten different Afghanistans would result" ("Suriye Fay Hattı, Tüm Bölge Yanar," 2011) In light of these developments, Turkey's relations with the Assad regime deteriorated.
By February 2012, regime change through regional and international pressure was the obvious objective of Turkey's Syrian policy. To that end, Turkey supported the "Arab-European" UN Security Council draft resolution on Syria, which requested that Assad forfeit power and specified that additional measures would be taken unless he complied within 15 days. However, Russia and China vetoed the resolution (Stahn, 2013: 961-962; Ayoob, 2012: 85; Hinnebusch, 2012: 111; Emiroğlu, 2012) . Subsequent to the rejection of the resolution, Turkey offered harsh However, Damascus was not content to solely obtain the support of the "leftist, secular and nationalist" parties within Turkey and sought to send a message to the conservative side in Turkey. Syria's first concrete step was inviting the conservative Felicity Party to Damascus. The Felicity Party visited Damascus on January 6, 2012. The party chair, Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kamalak, responded to public criticisms by underlining that the party wished for an end to the bloodshed and that they would visit Syria to warn Assad. Felicity Party, "Kamalak, Esad'a 'Muhalefetin Sesi Dinlenmeli' dedi," January 7, 2012, http://www.saadet.org.tr/haber/kamalak-esada-muhalefetin-sesi-dinlenmeli-dedi. "Kamalak, Suriye'de Esad'ı Uyarmaya Gittik," Milli Gazete, November 21, 2012. 6 Indeed, for six months, Turkey attempted to persuade Assad to meet the legitimate demands of the Syrian people. Provided that Assad had implemented a gradual strategy to satisfy the demands of the Syrian population, he would have prevented the increase in violent incidents since March 2011 and the subsequent uprisings for freedom. In his statement regarding the crisis in Syria, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç responded to criticisms by saying "What happened and how did things go wrong? Although our friendly relations with Syria were at their peak, thousands of people had not died. What do we do in Syria? Why do we interfere there? Why do we act like this? Friends, beware of God. Are your hearts not torn out by the large number of people murdered? "Neden Suriye ile İlişkiler Bozuldu?," Türkiye, April 13, 2012. In his speech to the party group in the National Assembly on January 31, 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan mentioned the same issue and indicated that Turkey had not intended to interfere in any state's internal affairs. He explained that when Turkey was asked to enter Iraq, although fully prepared, Turkey had refrained based on its goodwill with the Iraqi people. He further indicated the Turkish intention of refraining from invading Syria and that Turkey would not go where it was not welcome. "Erdoğan'dan Grup Toplantısında Önemli Mesajlar," Hürriyet, January 31, 2012. 7 "Beyrut'ta PKK Sesleri," Hürriyet, October 31, 2011. At this time, another new development occurred in Syria's Kamışlı region. Mişel Temo, a leading figure of the Syrian Kurds and a supporter of the Syrian National Council, was assassinated in front of his house. In March 2012, Civan Xelef, the nephew of Mişel Temo, was also killed as a result of severe torture. Similar to Temo, Xelef had been struggling against the Assad regime.
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Volume 11/2 Winter 2016 criticism against Russia and China. 8 Although the resolution was voted down by Russia and China, a new resolution prepared by the Arab Union and backed by Turkey was presented in the UN General Assembly in less than two weeks. The nonbinding resolution condemned the use of force by the Syrian government against the opposition and called upon Assad to step down ("BM, Suriye'yi Kınama Tasarısını Kabul Etti," 2012).
When the clashes in Syria reached the point of threatening international peace and security, 9 former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was appointed by the UN and the League of Arab States as a Special Envoy to Syria to work as an intermediary between the sides. After intense negotiations, Damascus announced on April 12 that the Syrian government would accept the implementation of a six-point UN proposal for peace known as the Annan Plan. Annan's plan called for an end to violence; a commitment to work with the Envoy in an exclusive Syrian-led political process, including the appointment of an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy; access for humanitarian agencies to provide relief to those in need; the release of detainees; the initiation of broader political dialogues that included the aspirations of the Syrian people; and unrestricted access to the country for the international media ("UN Peacekeeping Chief in Syria to Assess Progress of Military Observers," 2012; .
In his speech regarding the Annan Plan, Prime Minister Erdoğan declared his mistrust of Bashar al-Assad, saying that, "The Syrian regime should by no means be allowed to manipulate the plan to save time. We do not aim to take advantage of a nation's victimhood. The promises from the Syrian side have been broken. The Syrian regime has tried to repress its nation's demands violently. Son Bashar al-Assad has been following the same course of action comprising violence that his father Hafız Assad adopted in the recent past" ("Suriye'nin Dostları Baskıyı Arttırdı," 2012). At this stage, Turkish expectations for the crisis in Syria were consistent with the decisions of the international community.
To further this purpose, a "Friends of Syria" meeting was organized with Turkish backing on April 1 in Istanbul, at which Western and Arab foreign ministers from more than 70 countries collaborated to increase the pressure on the Syrian regime.
10 Damascus was warned not to impede the implementation of the UN and Arab Union common peace plan, 11 and the opposition Syrian 8 The officially published notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs state that "The UN Security Council permanent members' right to veto entails serious responsibilities…We regret that owing to the aforementioned vetoes, the UN Security Council would fail to satisfy its fundamental responsibility which assigns it to preserve international peace and security. National Council was recognized as the "legitimate representative of all Syrians." The Syrian National Council declared that anti-regime insurgents would be paid salaries and that soldiers who changed sides would also be paid ("Suriye'nin Dostları Baskıyı Arttırdı," 2012). However, the US and France, who had sent ministerial-level representatives to the meeting, expressed their discontent for an approach that would hamper the Annan Plan. In his statement following the meeting in Istanbul, the Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations underscored his request that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Western countries avoid any actions that could endanger the Annan Plan.
12
Critical developments occurred after summer 2012 as Turkey continued pressing for change in Syria. A Turkish F-4 jet was shot down by Syrian security forces, inciting months of arguments that further eroded bilateral relations (Atlas, 2012) . At first, Syrian officials alleged that the plane had not been identified as a Turkish military aircraft and that an airplane that penetrated Syrian air space over Syrian territorial waters was shot down. However, in a detailed briefing two days later, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu claimed that the Turkish military aircraft was deliberately downed. On June 22, 2012, Turkey announced that its rules of engagement towards Syria had changed. A diplomatic note was issued to the Syrian Embassy in Istanbul, 13 and Prime Minister Erdoğan issued a message on behalf of the Turkish government that any aircraft from the Syrian side crossing into Turkish air space would be shot down without any warning.
14 Although Turkey continued to allege that its aircraft had been in international air space, the US and Russia ignored the allegations.
Meanwhile, responding to the call of UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan, who sought a peaceful resolution to the crisis, foreign ministers of the permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as Turkey, Qatar, Iraq and Kuwait met in Geneva, Switzerland on June 30, 2012 (Yakış, 2014: 800) . The resulting international peace conference, named the "Action Group for Syria," discussed the future of Syria and accepted Annan's six-point plan in the transition period. The meeting was productive because it gained participation from Russia, which had been previously supporting the Syrian regime (Atlas, 2012: 218; Allison, 2013: 798-799; Katz, 2012: 38-39) , in an international initiative for post-Assad period planning. Nevertheless, the principles presented in the agreement regarding the transition period were not implemented. Moreover, no concrete peaceful resolution for the Syrian crisis emerged from the meeting (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Türkiye-Suriye Siyasi İlişkileri"). As the efforts to resolve and mediate the crisis in Syria failed, Annan announced his resignation.
15
Esad'a: Çekil," Hürriyet, January 23, 2012. The Syrian government rejected the Arab Union plan, declaring it to be a serious interference in their internal affairs. "Suriye Arap Birliği'nin Planını Reddetti" Hürriyet, January 23, 2012. 12 It could be argued that the "Friends of Syria" meeting held in Istanbul did not produce the results Turkey was expecting. 13 Turkey alleged in the issued note that the downing of the aircraft was unacceptable and that Syria was totally responsible. Meanwhile, Turkey emphasized that it would take action consistent with its rights under international law and would take all necessary measures in response to Syria's attack against the unarmed aircraft flying over international waters. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Suriye Açıklarında Düşürülen Askeri Uçağımız Konusunda Bakanlığımızca Atılan Adımlar Hk.," No: 173, June 24, 2012, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-173_-24-haziran-2012_-suriyeaciklarinda-dusurulen-askeri-ucagimiz-konusunda-bakanligimizca-atilan-adimlar-hk_.tr.mfa. 14 The new rules of engagement of the Turkish Armed Forces that Prime Minister Erdoğan announced mandated how the Turkish army would react and intervene in case of an incursion. For instance, according to the "Rules of Engagement," several gradual warnings would be given in response to a foreign aircraft violating Turkish air space. However, under the new conditions between Turkey and Syria, Turkey announced that Syrian armed forces would be shot down without any warning when violating Turkish air space. Mehmet Barlas, "TSK'nın Angajman Kuralları Değişince Ne Olur?," Sabah, June 27, 2012. 15 "Suriye'deki Şiddetin Son Kurbanı Kofi Annan," Euronews, August 2, 2012. After his resignation, Annan wrote about his impressions on Syria in the Financial Times and indicated the probability that civilian casualties would increase and
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On July 8, 2012, the onset of an armed struggle between the Syrian army and opposition groups near the villages of Isaviye and Aylaklı in the province of Latakia ignited a wide range of incidents. Following the clashes, the army began operations in the region and bombarded the civilian settlements. Chairman of the Syrian Turkmen National Bloc Yusuf Molla stated that "during the operations, aircrafts and choppers started firing randomly at the region of clashes," and the struggle began pressing in upon the Turkish border. Because of these operations, a wave of Syrian refugees moved toward Turkey between July 9 and 11, and the number of refugees exceeded one hundred thousand by 2012.
16
In a new effort to facilitate an end to the tragedy and establish a peaceful environment, the third meeting of the "Friends of Syria" group was held in Paris on July 6, 2012. The group decided that the sanctions imposed on Syria needed to be strengthened in order to be adopted by additional countries and emphasized the need for more cooperation with and increased support for the Syrian opposition. Participants in the meeting also reinforced their support for the legitimate means of self-defense to which the Syrian public had been resorting (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Türkiye-Suriye Siyasi İlişkileri"). In an interview with CNN's Christian Amanpour, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that the region needed peace, prosperity and stability and that the US was most likely delaying an intervention because of the US elections.
17 He emphasized the need for the UN to establish a no-fly zone. Erdoğan added that the US lacked initiative on Syria, which he thought was due to the upcoming US presidential election, and he conveyed Turkish gratitude for the US administration's declaration of its policy against the Syrian regime ("Bu Senaryo, Bölge İçin Kıyamet Demek," 2012).
Meanwhile, during the escalating conflicts between regime and opposition forces occurring close to the Turkish border after September 20, 2012, mortar shells struck Akçakale, a town in the province of Şanlıurfa. On October 3, Syrian military forces fired mortar shells into Akçakale, killing 5, including a mother and her children, and injuring 13 Turkish citizens. Turkish Armed Forces immediately responded within the scope of the new rules of engagement, striking 14 targets inside Syria. 18 The Grand National Assembly of Turkey was also called to a plenary session on October 4 with Syria on the agenda after the Akçakale attack. The meeting attendees assessed that the ongoing crisis in Syria continued to weaken the stability and security of the region as well as Turkish national security. Moreover, hostile attacks had been directed towards Turkish territory emphasized the incapability of the international community to end the violence in Syria. Annan, who asked Syrian President Assad to resign his office to facilitate a solution for the crisis, further added that no military formula would end the chaos. Annan called upon Russia, China and Iran to reassess their positions and asked those supporting the opposition, including the US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and England, to reconsider as well. Emphasizing that the international community should begin to take common action, Annan called for US President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin to take the necessary steps. Kofi Annan, "My Departing Advice on How to Save Syria," Financial Times, August 2, 2012. 16 A meeting of the UN Security Council concerning the Syrian refugee situation was called on August 30, 2012 in New York by France, who had assumed the presidency of the Security Council. In the meeting, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu emphasized the need to establish a safe haven for Syrian refugees and noted the severity of the increasing economic burden on neighboring countries due to the refugee influx. He proposed establishing a buffer zone on the Syrian border. "Davutoğlu New York'ta," Anadolu Agency, August 30, 2012. Robins, "Turkey's 'Double Gravity' Predicament," 395. Bishku, " 36, [49] [50] In 2012, Barack Obama was re-elected to a second term, defeating Republican challenger Mitt Romney. 18 Ümit Çetin, "Türkiye, Suriye'ye Karşılık Verdi," Hürriyet, October 4, 2012. After the retaliation, Turkey warned Syria not to move its warplanes and helicopters within 10 km of the Turkish border. Artillery units were also warned not to fire shells close to the Turkish border. Meanwhile, in an urgent meeting on the night of October 3, the North Atlantic Council condemned the Syrian attack against Turkey and declared that it would continue to support Turkey. On October 5, 2012, the UN Security Council issued a press statement and condemned the Syrian attacks into Akçakale, emphasizing the serious effects of the Syrian crisis on the security, regional peace and stability of neighboring countries.
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since September 20, 2012 as part of the Syrian Arab Republic Military Forces' operations. The meetings emphasized that despite several warnings from the Turkish side and all diplomatic attempts, these attacks against Turkish territory continued and threatened to become armed actions. With the situation gradually escalating into a threat for Turkish national security, the need for timely and rapid action against additional risks and threats was addressed. Within this framework, having voted in a closed session to approve the cross-border operations, the Turkish government expanded the scope of the resolution to prevent additional threats from Syria. The resolution on the deployment of Turkish troops in foreign countries whenever necessary was approved in the Grand National Assembly plenary session ("İşte Suriye Tezkeresinin Detayları," 2012).
In response to threats to Turkish national security posed by the ongoing Syrian crisis, the North Atlantic Council meeting of foreign ministers was held on December 4, 2012. The sides agreed on the reinforcement of the Turkish national air defense system to both protect the Turkish public and territory and ease the crisis occurring at the border. Patriot missile batteries from Germany, Holland and the US were deployed in Turkey (Robins, 2013: 396) .
Based on reactions from the international community, the fourth meeting of the "Friends of Syria" was organized in Marrakesh on December 12, 2012 to coordinate efforts to overcome the Syrian crisis. The Syrian National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces, which aims to unify the Syrian opposition under a single organization, participated in the meeting, which was the first "Friends of Syria" meeting since the Coalition's foundation. Several speakers at the meeting, including representatives from Turkey, England, Germany and France, called for recognition of the Syrian unified opposition by the international community as soon as possible. The meeting revealed that the Assad regime had lost its legitimacy.
Besides, the first meeting of the "Syrian Turkmen Assembly" was held in Istanbul on December 15 to discuss the difficulties that Syrian Turkmens, who had been struggling to overthrow the regime, had experienced due to the tragedy in Syria. Key topics discussed in the meeting included the lack of organization and cooperation of the Syrian Turkmens and their risk of losing their legitimacy. The Syrian Turkmens gathered under a single roof at the Istanbul meeting. Turkey offered complete support for the Syrian Turkmens in the meeting. Abdullah Gül, the President of Turkey, stated in his message that Syrian Turkmens have been an integral part of the Turkish nation and that discussions in the meeting would serve as preparations for the achievement of Turkmen rights and legal order essential for the future planning of Syria (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Cumhurbaşkanı Gül'den Suriye Türkmenleri Platformu'na Mesaj: 'Suriye Türkmenleri, Büyük Milletimizin Ayrılmaz Parçasıdır,"2012) .
In evaluating 2012 in Turkish-Syrian relations, it could be argued that the Arab Spring, which emanated from Middle Eastern and North African countries and was pervasive in Syria, presented a breaking point in the relations of Syria with both Turkey and the international community. The year 2012 was a period of mutually escalating tension in relations between Turkey and Syria. Turkey called on the Assad regime to reform on several occasions but was disappointed. Heightened tension in the statements of both countries indicated further discord in relations. Regional and international efforts to immediately end the tragedy and massacre and achieve a peaceful resolution in Syria had failed to produce a concrete solution, worsening the situation and increasing the bloodshed in Syria.
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2013: Has Turkey Been Left Alone?
By 2013, a shift had occurred in the regional and international balance, and global actors began to structure their attitudes in accordance with that shift. Turkey was greatly disappointed because its expectations were not fulfilled and it became somewhat isolated. Moreover, Turkey suffered additional effects from the burden imposed by the nearby crisis.
In 2013, no considerable change had occurred in the relations between Turkey and Syria, and tension in bilateral relations continued to escalate. The bomb explosions that occurred on February 11, 2013 in the region between the Cilvegözü border gate near the town of Reyhanlı and the Syrian gate of Bab al-Hawa near the Turkish-Syrian border further eroded relations. The explosion raised several questions concerning the course of events between Turkey and Syria. In particular, the attack indicated how the instability, loss of authority and laxity of controls in Syria and at the Turkish-Syrian border could negatively affect Turkish national security.
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As the tragedy in Syria continued and claimed more lives, foreign ministers of member states participated in the next meeting of the "Friends of Syria" in Istanbul on April 20, 2013, believing that international cooperation should not weaken. The meeting was a means to maintain efforts to enhance the organization and strengthening of the Syrian National Council. Countries directly involved in the Syrian issue attended the meeting, which was called the "Friends of Syria Core Group" meeting. In addition to Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, foreign ministers from the US, England, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Italy, Germany and France and senior officials and representatives of the Syrian National Council participated in the meeting. Davutoğlu said that Turkey sought the reconstruction of peace and stability and to end the cruelty in Syria and the region. He added that considering explicit support of the Syrian National Council and using the political willpower of the 11 member states to stop the massacre in the region would be worthwhile for everyone involved ("Kerry ile Ortak Basın Toplantısı,"2013).
The "Friends of Syria" meeting again led to an expectation of change in Syria. Prior to the meeting, the new US Secretary of State John Kerry offered signs of being more active on the Syrian issue. As a result of the meeting, a 15-point declaration was announced on behalf of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, and decisions were made that paved the way for US support for the Syrian opposition such as excluding rising radical Islamist movements and groups, guaranteeing security to minority groups, emphasizing the goal of a democratic Syria and obtaining support for the military opposition over the High Military Council. Although external actors in favor of change in Syria aimed to overcome the Syrian problem, those at the meetings could neither completely coordinate their efforts nor fulfill their promises due to their failure at managing politics among themselves.
Terrorist attacks and explosions had been occurring in the border regions of Turkey where Syrians had been taking refuge. The incident with the most casualties occurred in Reyhanlı, a town in the province of Hatay, on May 11, 2013, with the explosion of car bombs outside the local municipal building that resulted in 51 deaths and almost 100 injuries ("Reyhanlı Cehenneme Döndü," 2013). Because of the Turkish policy towards Syria, the incident could be regarded as a Syrian attempt to draw Turkey into the Syrian chaos and expand the area of combat. The incident could have compelled Turkey to retreat and caused the Turkish public to question its government's Syrian policy, thus driving Turkey to assume a more internally focused policy. The incident also demonstrated that the civil war in Syria was extortionately threatening Turkish national security.
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However, Turkish government claimed that it had implemented a legitimate foreign policy by standing by the "righteous."
Another adverse effect of Syrian developments on Turkey was the reemergence of discussions over the issue of Syrian Kurds. With the support of Hezbollah (Taheri, 2013: 218) and Iran, regime forces made progress against the opposition and altered their internal dynamics, reigniting the power struggle between the opposition and the PYD. The opposition aimed to expand their area of influence in the north by gaining complete control, and the PYD sought to establish its own area of control through the possible success of the regime or, in case of the opposition's strengthening position, in its own areas. The power struggle in Syria continued to escalate between the Kurdish parties in Kurdish majority areas. During a period of intense arguments over solutions concerning the "Kurdish issue" in Turkey, Kongra-Gel (People's Congress of Kurdistan) held its 9 th General Assembly in July 2013 and released a "Political Attitude Manifesto." Regarding Syria, the manifesto said that "The declaration of an interim administration in Rojava, expanding the scope of politics, assumed the transformation of the interim administration into a Kurdish local government." In the Kurdish majority Syrian regions and regions under PYD control, the initiation of an electoral process, and ultimately the declaration of political autonomy, was inferred.
A further violent incident in Syria-chemical assaults in some neighborhoods of Damascus (Stahn, 2013: 956) -occurred on August 21 st , during a period when the balance was changing in almost every region of Syria and the situation was becoming more complicated, raising questions about whether the civil war had entered a new phase. 20 Subsequent to the chemical weapons attack, a US-led military intervention in Syria arose as a possibility. Statements by US Secretary of State John Kerry regarding the chemical weapons attacks in Syria were perceived as a sign of potential US military intervention in Syria. However, these expectations were deflated at Kerry's meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Geneva, Switzerland. After three days of negotiations, they agreed that Syrian officials should provide a list of their chemical weapons and destroy or remove them by mid-2014. In case of Syria's non-compliance with its obligation to destroy its chemical weapons, Russia and the US agreed to implement measures described in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which allows military intervention to maintain peace (Stahn, 2013: 964) . The Assad regime agreed to the negotiated deal.
Several factors influenced the agreement reached by the US and Russia. First, Russia maintained its position in the region, and the Kremlin's prestige and influence in the region and the international arena increased (Allison, 2013: 808) . In return for saving Assad from a foreign intervention, Russia gained an opportunity to transform the Port of Tartus from a supply base into a genuine Russian naval base (Ayoob, 2012: 85-86; Allison, 2013: 807-808) . US President Obama was satisfied with the agreement because the American public had been expressing discontent with US wars abroad. Except for some of the Syrian opposition, the agreement was almost universally welcomed throughout the world.
Turkey was dissatisfied with the agreement because it left Turkey isolated in its policy toward Syria. 21 On the other hand, the strengthening Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISID), which was reliant on Al-Qaeda, made the possibility of military intervention almost nonexistent. ISID and other radical Islamist groups coming to the fore in Syria began to alter the internal balance and international perceptions in favor of the regime. The threat of radical Islam paved the way for the US-Russian approach to the Syrian issue and created an area of mutual interest. Moreover, the 20 Even today, the debates continue over who the real offenders of the attack were. The most astonishing allegation was put forward by Seymour M. Hersh and he pointed countries against Assad, as the real offenders of the attack (Hersh, 2014: 21-24) . 21 Turkey expected a change of regime in Syria in the short run by means of a US-led military intervention.
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Volume 11/2 Winter 2016 YPG (People's Protection Units), the official armed wing of the PYD, which was the political organization of the Syrian Kurds, increased its control in the Kurdish settlement regions and became more active. Due to divisions and Islamist tendencies within the opposition and because of an authority gap, the opposition began to weaken in other respects (Landis, 2012: 74-77; Ayoob, 2012: 86; Hinnebusch, 2012: 110) . Moreover, ISID's increased strength in Northern Syria intensified the mass migration to Turkey, which escalated Turkey's existing social, economic and security-related challenges. The war in Syria had transformed into a multidimensional civil war.
In addition to external developments, Turkey experienced the Gezi incidents beginning in summer 2013 that transformed into anti-government protests. Beginning in Istanbul, the protests spread to additional cities. Consequently, Turkey's interest in Syria faded, and Turkey began to focus more on domestic problems. However, Turkey's shooting down of a Syrian helicopter at the Turkish border for violating its air space in September 2013, based on the new rules of engagement, demonstrated that the conflict between Turkey and Syria was not over ("Türk Jeti Suriye Helikopterini Vurdu," 2013).
Although international efforts aimed at producing a solution for the Syrian problem have been ongoing, incidents have also occurred that have escalated tensions between Turkey and Syria. Rather than conducting a military operation triggered by a violation of "red lines" (Taheri, 2013: 220; Stahn, 2013: 957-958) in Syria, an environment of reconciliation shaped around US and Russian interests has existed during this period, the people in Syria and Turkey have been left alone.
Conclusions
Despite the success of Turkey's "zero problems with neighbors" policy, implemented over a decade with the goal of opening new markets and expanding Turkish access to the Middle East, Turkey experienced the new realities of the region with the emergence of the Syrian crisis through a period in which the struggle for power in Syria transformed into a bloody civil war. Turkey initially struggled to quickly implement policies that would preserve the stability and unity of Damascus. Once the problem escalated, Turkey attempted to determine whether the Assad regime would succeed in controlling the opposition in the country. Because the Assad regime failed to accomplish that objective, Turkey warned the administration and demanded the implementation of necessary reforms in an attempt to prevent the increasing incidents from deepening the social conflict in Syria. Turkey cultivated intimate relations with the Syrian administration until quite recently but struggled to encourage transformation of the regime by means of constitutional reforms. Because Turkey's expectations of Syrian reforms were not satisfied, Turkey called for Assad's removal from power and attempted to encourage countries in the region to actively support sanctions against Syria. Conversely, Russia and China became centers of criticism due to their negative attitude in the UN Security Council. From the Turkish perspective, the Russian and Chinese policies drove Syria into a greater state of chaos. In fact, Turkey's miscalculation of the Assad regime's resilience, the structure of the opposition and the efficiency of regional actors all contributed to Turkey's disappointment that its expectations for Syria were not fulfilled (Phillips, 2012: 139) .
Turkey has begun addressing the Syrian strife occurring near its borders with more caution, being aware of the severe consequences that the chaos would bear if Turkey made miscalculations in approaching the problem. Turkey has also been concerned about the political, economic and social problems likely to be generated as a consequence of social disintegration in Syria, which could result in the transformation of Nusayri, Kurdish, Sunni and Christian regions into semiindependent military and political structures corresponding to those in Lebanon. In addition to the developments related to the Syrian crisis, Turkey has dealt with political unrest that began with the 
